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Abstract1
Marine harvesters face significant livelihood challenges due to the impacts2
of climate change on marine ecosystems, and due to economic fluctuations3
that influence their incomes. In this study, we demonstrate vulnerability as4
a product of the interactions among marine harvesters, government and buy-5
ers. We combined Elinor Ostrom’s attention to the influence of institutions6
on resource exploitation, with political ecology’s attention to social relations7
and larger-scale political economic processes. We demonstrate the benefits8
of this approach by examining the multi-species fishery of Barrington, Nova9
Scotia. We conducted 31 semi-structured interviews and 113 surveys in the10
summer of 2012 with buyers, harvesters, and local experts. We used Ostrom’s11
SES framework to pinpoint system elements that were salient to respondents,12
with attention to household vulnerability outcomes. Based on an analysis of13
these themes, we outline three processes affecting vulnerability outcomes:14
1) Harvesters preferred individual over collective action due to low proce-15
dural justice and social cohesion in decision-making, 2) agents with greater16
political and economic power gained control over fishing access-rights while17
others became more dependent on lobster, and 3) economic and ecological18
conditions, combined with increased dependence, incentivized harvesters to19
catch more lobsters as prices declined. The case suggests that actors sense20
of control over their resource base and perception of justice in the process of21
institutional design may be as significant in vulnerability as the exogenous22
drivers of change that affect livelihood outcomes. We suggest interventions23
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that may improve these interactions among government, harvesters and buy-24
ers, and improve the livelihoods in coastal communities.25
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1. Introduction26
Processes of global economic and environmental change have exposed27
fishing households to novel challenges, including market volatility, changing28
frequency and severity of extreme events, and changing patterns of species29
abundance and distribution (Brander, 2007; Holland, 2011; Worldfish Cen-30
tre, 2007). Many vulnerability studies have focused on household attributes31
leading to vulnerable outcomes (Eakin and Luers, 2006). These studies con-32
sider the institutional environment as a structural constraint for households.33
In this study, we argue that more attention needs to be paid to the inter-34
actions through which actors influence the institutional environment. We35
demonstrate the importance of these interactions by examining the case of a36
multi-species fishery in Southwest Nova Scotia (SWNS).37
In the following study, we make two theoretical and methodological con-38
tributions. First, we demonstrate vulnerability as a product of three inter-39
actions: 1) between marine harvesters2 and government, 2) between har-40
vesters and buyers, and 3) among harvesters. Second, we combine the social-41
ecological systems framework (Ostrom, 2007), which highlights the influence42
of institutions3 on resource exploitation, with political ecology’s emphasis on43
the perceptions and agency of key actors, and the contribution of justice and44
equity to measuring the success of institutions.45
We examined fishing households in Barrington, SWNS, to understand46
household vulnerability. We analyzed harvester’s perceptions of the institu-47
tions and social interactions occurring among households, associations, and48
Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO), a federal management organization.49
We analyzed social interactions to observe legitimacy and trust among actors.50
Institutional interactions are the mechanisms that influence the interactions51
between actors, and between harvesters and their fishing grounds. We then52
examined the influence of these interactions on household vulnerability and53
livelihood strategies, and how these livelihood strategies scale-up to produce54
outcomes for the fishing districts of SWNS.55
2Hereafter referred to as harvesters
3Defined as formal or informal rules that govern the behavior of individuals or groups
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2. Structure, agency, and environmental change in fisheries56
In this section, we highlight the theoretical contributions of commons57
research and vulnerability research to the fisheries context. We argue for58
greater emphasis on interactions, rather than variables and attributes.59
While early scholars pointed to over-exploitation in fisheries as a tragedy60
of the commons (Gordon, 1954; Schaefer, 1957), commons literature showed61
that people often engage in collective action to manage resources (e.g., Os-62
trom, 1990; Baland and Platteau, 1996). Ostrom (2007) expanded on this lit-63
erature by incorporating important variables for natural resource governance64
into a social-ecological systems (SES) framework. This framework allows65
scholars to analyze interactions and outcomes by examining the variables66
that characterize the components of SESs. The SES framework is intended67
to be used by disciplines to locate their contribution to a body of knowledge,68
and to complement the knowledge generated in other disciplines. McGinnis69
and Ostrom (2014) have updated this framework to improve generalizability,70
and to outline the logical relationships between system components. Basurto71
et al. (2013) showed how actors can self-govern fisheries through different72
pathways and conditions, and recommended a grounded approach to avoid73
blind spots in analysis. In this study, we follow these recommendations by74
using the SES framework to highlight important themes, but we allow the75
relationships between themes to emerge based on interview responses. While76
we analyze the fishery SES at the community level, we use a political ecology77
framing to account for cross-scale interactions by situating local interactions78
within larger-scale political economic, and ecological processes.79
The commons and SES approach has often focused on outcomes that im-80
prove ecosystems or resource use efficiency (Ostrom, 2005). These approaches81
have also focused on variables, institutions, and interactions that occur at the82
“local” scale. Vulnerability scholars, however, have demonstrated the impor-83
tance of paying attention to characteristics of the political-economic setting,84
as well as power relations and social justice4 (McLaughlin and Dietz, 2008;85
Eakin, 2005; Wisner, 2003; Downing et al., 1996; Kelly and Adger, 2000). In86
this study, we explore the complementarities of these two approaches.87
The term vulnerability refers to the risk that social, economic, or environ-88
4Defined as an equitable distribution of benefits and burdens, as well as the social
processes, institutions, and the abilities of humans to develop their own capacities (see
Nussbaum, 2001; Schlosberg, 2009; Honneth, 1996; Adger et al., 2006)
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mental stressors will lead to adverse outcomes for individuals, households, or89
social groups (Clark et al., 2000). Humans, however, are not just recipients of90
the effects of these stressors, they are agents capable of coping with change,91
or altering their biophysical or political-economic landscape (Adger, 1996).92
The ability of social groups to shape the landscape to meet their needs or93
interests depends on their political and economic power. McLaughlin and94
Dietz (2008) have described these interactions among structure, agency, and95
the environment as a “socially constructed adaptive landscape” that actors96
adapt to and shape by legitimizing or delegitimizing specific social structures97
and boundaries.98
Vulnerability is often contrasted with resilience, which refers to the ca-99
pacity of an SES to persist and adapt to avoid radical system state changes100
when exposed to disturbances (Adger, 2006; Carpenter et al., 2001). These101
two bodies of literature share an emphasis on enhancing the ability of an102
SES to adapt to perturbations (Adger, 2006). In the study of SESs, vul-103
nerability contributes understanding of social dynamics and human agency,104
while resilience contributes insights into social-ecological feedbacks, critical105
thresholds, and social-ecological transformation (Miller et al., 2010). While106
recognizing the complementarity of resilience to understanding SES dynam-107
ics, vulnerability is the central theme of our study.108
Individuals and households are linked to political-economic structures109
through their agency, social capital, and decision-making procedures. The110
local-level bonds and extra-local networks that constitute social capital (Adger,111
2003) “may be a community’s best resource in maintaining a capacity to112
change collective direction” (Pelling and High, 2005, p. 317). When commu-113
nities have strong local-level bonds but weak extra-local networks, and when114
the state is largely coercive with low legitimacy, the state clashes with civil115
society, exacerbating the vulnerability of communities (Adger, 2003). The116
legitimacy of the state depends on procedural justice, or the degree to which117
households and individuals perceive decision-making processes and structures118
to be fair (Folger et al., 1983; Adger et al., 2006). Daigle et al. (1996) outlined119
the criteria for procedural justice in fisheries decisions, and argued that these120
criteria are necessary to prevent conflicts, and to wisely manage resources.121
In this study, we focused on perceived injustice, and, to the extent possible,122
triangulated those perceptions with additional evidence. Nevertheless, both123
subjective and objective forms of procedural injustice limit human agency124
by reinforcing a belief that individuals cannot play a role in shaping their125
governance regimes.126
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Structure, agency, and the environment interact at different scales, and127
actors at different levels negotiate access to resources. Strategies that are128
adaptive at the household level may scale-up to create larger-scale system-129
level fragilities. For example, in response to market liberalization and envi-130
ronmental change, Eakin and Wehbe (2009) found that farmers adaptations131
in Mexico and Argentina, such as changing crop choice, diversification, and132
land tenure had important implications for the resilience of the regional econ-133
omy, for the risk of landslides and soil erosion, and for forest biodiversity.134
Conversely, policies such as fishing effort controls designed to ensurer re-135
source sustainability at the regional level can create vulnerable conditions136
for households who depend on those resources by reducing their access to137
economic opportunities (Cheung and Sumaila, 2008). The management of138
an SES is effective according to the degree to which it applies rules that139
are scaled to match problems (Cash et al., 2006), and uses incentive struc-140
tures that promote stewardship (Eakin and Wehbe, 2009). Chen et al. (2014)141
demonstrate that vulnerability analysis could play a role as a policy tool for142
matching rules to problems, and for mitigating current and future impacts143
of economic and ecological change on vulnerable harvesters.144
Cases of fisheries governance illustrate the interactions among structure,145
agency and the environment across scales. Neoliberal reforms at multiple146
levels have exposed fishing communities to new constraints, opportunities,147
and disturbances (Young, 2001). For example, Young (2001) found that148
Mexican policies aiming to promote foreign investment in the fishing sector149
exacerbated destructive fishing practices, due to the incursion of outside fish150
harvesters backed by private capital, and due to downsized state resources151
devoted to monitoring and enforcement. Fisheries governance debates center152
on property-rights and access regimes. Localized harvesters are often willing153
to support regulations to encourage stewardship, but inappropriate forms of154
access rights effectively remove these groups from the decision-making pro-155
cess, as local and extra-local actors with greater market power gain control156
of these rights (Cinti et al., 2010; Gilmour et al., 2012). Basurto and Ne-157
nadovic (2012) compare two such property-regimes in Mexican communities,158
and found evidence to suggest that while individual permits empowered non-159
fishing groups with economic power, a marine tenure grant incentivized Seri160
harvesters to self-organize and develop effective access rules and limit over-161
fishing. Seri harvesters only acted collectively, however, when they perceived162
a common threat to their fishing grounds. Below, we will contribute fur-163
ther insights on the influence of governance, decision-making processes, and164
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access rights on social cohesion, fishing practices, and collective outcomes.165
3. Study Site: Barrington, Nova Scotia166
Barrington municipality includes many small communities situated around167
fishing ports. The total population of this municipality is 6,994. Barrington168
has been in a state of economic decline since the mid 1990s, when the DFO169
began to set strict regulations on the groundfisheries (i.e. cod, haddock, pol-170
lock) after the collapse of codfish stocks in Atlantic Canada. Despite similar171
economic conditions to many maritime fishing towns, Barrington has been a172
hotbed for civil disobedience, and sometimes violent responses to DFO reg-173
ulations and enforcement. More recently, harvesters from Barrington have174
formed a new Lobster Fishermen’s Association that promises to “take back175
the industry.” Barrington is an important source of resistance to fisheries176
policy, and the study of this region is important for understanding the pro-177
cesses that lead to poor relationships between government and civil society178
in the maritimes.179
Although much of the findings described here are likely to be persis-180
tent, it is important to acknowledge the special conditions under which this181
fieldwork was conducted. The abundance, distribution, quantity and qual-182
ity of lobsters in Atlantic Canada and the Gulf of Maine were affected by183
a “sea surface temperature anomaly” (Mills et al., 2013). These conditions184
may have caused a heightened sense of vulnerability among harvesters. This185
sense of vulnerability may explain the strikes and price wars in 2012, which186
were unprecedented in scale.5187
3.1. Multi-Species Fishing and Regulations188
The lobster fishery is currently managed by the DFO under advice from189
regional management boards. The regulations, summarized in Table 1, place190
emphasis on protecting juvenile and egg bearing lobsters to ensure reproduc-191
tive success. Additionally, restrictions on traps, boat size, and limited entry192
5A small harvester’s strike also occurred in Barrington in 2008 (Comeau, 2008, Decem-
ber 1), and again in Cape Breton and Prince Edward Island in 2013 (Pottie, 2013, May
13; Sharratt) . But price wars were most prevalent in Canada and Maine in 2012, with
strikes in Maine and Southwest Nova Scotia, and a blockade of imported Maine lobsters
at a processing plant in New Brunswick (CBC News, 2012, August 2).
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licensing are intended to ensure profitable livelihoods to fishermen, and pre-193
vent overcapitalization of the fishing fleet. Gear restrictions are in place to194
prevent habitat damage, protect marine mammals, and reduce the catch of195
incidental species.196
While there are no limits on the amount of effort a harvester can put into197
lobstering, groundfishing is primarily limited by quotas. This system was put198
in place in the 1990s to reduce rampant overfishing and overcapitalization.199
Groundfishing vessels are divided by size and gear-type, and harvesters within200
these divisions became members of various quota management groups. The201
largest and most active quota groups maintain an individual transferable202
quota system, where quota can be bought, sold, and leased out. In the 2000s,203
the DFO also adopted quota management systems for halibut and swordfish.204
While historically, multi-species fishing was the norm in the region, today205
52% of harvesters in Barrington fished only for lobster (Barnett, 2014). All206
harvesters surveyed fished for lobsters, and the most important secondary207
fisheries included groundfish (30%), halibut (18%), and swordfish (16%).208
The percentage of a harvester’s income that came from lobster has increased209
from an average of 40% in the 1970s (Davis, 1984) to 82% today.210
While lobster landings have more than tripled in Maine and Canada since211
the 1990s, the groundfishery has continued to decline. From 2000 to 2011,212
the DFO reduced the total allowable catch for cod in the fixed-gear fishery213
from 3309 to 938 metric tons on Georges Bank, and 858 to 421 inshore. A214
DFO (2009) report found that stocks failed to recover due to a high rate215
of unexplained cod mortality. This mortality may be due to high predation216
rates from seals, discards and unreported landings, or environmental change.217
Thus, while the DFO has successfully achieved their goal of reducing effort218
in the fishery, groundfish sustainability goals have been more elusive.219
4. Methods220
Fieldwork in the summer of 2012 consisted of participant observation,221
semi-structured interviews and surveys. Upon arriving in Barrington we es-222
tablished connections with key informants based on contacts suggested by223
outside experts and during participant observation. Key informants helped224
to develop a list of potential respondents. We selected respondents randomly225
from this list and added potential respondents based on further recommenda-226
tions. We administered 113 face-to-face surveys of active captains and crew,227
interviewed 16 active harvesters considered to be knowledgeable, 5 buyers,228
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Management
Measures
Lobster Groundfish
Organization Management and Advisory boards and
advisory boards community quota groups
Effort Controls None Quota allocated based on
historical catch
Gear restrictions Trap limits Limits on fixed-gear use
and type
Seasons November-May June to February
(Georges Bank); April to
March (Scotian Shelf)
Entry Limited-entry licenses Limited-entry licenses
Vessel Size 15.2m maximum length Inshore fixed-gear vessel
Requirements class (<13.9m)
Monitoring DFO enforcement officers Some at-sea monitoring
and 100% dockside
monitoring
Size limits Minimum size None
requirements
Table 1: A summary of lobstering and groundfishing regulations
9
and 2 each of government officials and representatives, lobster association229
leaders, and groundfish association leaders.6 Questions varied for each type230
of respondent, but all respondents were asked four similar questions: 1) what231
are the biggest challenges to livelihoods in the industry today? 2) What232
changes have brought about these challenge? 3) What are (fishermen, buy-233
ers) doing to respond to these challenges? 4) What enables or limits their234
ability to respond?235
We transcribed and coded interviews, as well as qualitative responses236
from surveys. Our aim was to understand the drivers of social-ecological237
change, and the response strategies of resource users from the resource user’s238
perspective. In doing so, we aimed to make visible the nature of the so-239
cial and institutional relations that governed the SES. We accomplished this240
by constructing the dimensions and dynamics of the SES using the generic241
variables proposed by Ostrom (2007, 5183) from the perspective of each in-242
terviewee (see Table 2). Using the SES approach, we coded themes that243
corresponded to one of the 51 variables listed by Ostrom (2007) and coded244
sub-themes when themes were too general. We include the 13 most frequently245
occurring themes discussed by respondents to characterize attributes of the246
system. From political ecology, we elicited the interviewee’s individual inter-247
pretations of the specific decision-making constraints and opportunities they248
faced as they responded to exogenous stressors. These interpretations and249
attitudes form a critical part of our analysis of the meanings the interviewees250
themselves associated with the elements of SES functioning, as coded using251
Ostrom’s framework.252
We examined the relationships between themes by analyzing the degree253
to which themes or sub-themes co-occurred in a given response. This allows254
us to understand how the interviewees associated social and institutional pro-255
cesses and livelihood outcomes in their daily lives. The link between broader256
scale institutions and livelihood outcomes is central to political ecology. We257
analyzed the matrix of co-occurrence of themes using multidimensional scal-258
ing (MDS, UCInet). The resulting plot revealed clusters of co-occurring259
themes7.260
6For the purpose of anonymity, we refer to association leaders, officials and represen-
tatives as “local experts”, and use pseudonyms for all individuals.
7The stress value of an MDS plot indicates the amount of stress required to accurately
represent the interrelationships of themes in two-dimensional space. A two dimensional
plot with 13 objects has a 1% probability of exhibiting a stress level of 0.199 by random
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Table 2: Themes discussed by fishermen, buyers and local experts, represented according
to the SES framework (Ostrom, 2007, 2009; McGinnis and Ostrom, 2014)
Social, Economic and Political Settings (S)
Market incentives
B Market conditions (64)
Resource System (RS) Governance System (GS)
Human-constructed facilities Property-rights systems
B Tank-houses, lobster cars, and B Fish quotas/leasing (77)
lobster pounds (76)
Resource Units (RU) Actors (A)
Economic value Norms/social capital
B Quality of lobsters (82) B Sticking together (126)
Dependence on resource (82)
Action Situations
Interactions −→ Outcomes
Harvesting Social performance measures
B Lobstering strategy (119) B Livelihood outcomes (92)
Conflicts among users
B Price bargaining/conflict (77)
Deliberation processes
B Decision-making (99)
B Quota cuts (85)
Investment activities
B Buy-ups (76)
Related Ecosystems (ECO)
Climate patterns
B Climate-change/water temperature change (28)
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5. Results and Discussion261
MDS distinguished four main clusters of themes illustrated in Figure 1262
with a stress of 0.206. These clusters of themes and sub-themes form the263
basis for the structure of the discussion and quotes that follow.264
Dimension 1
1.00.50.0-0.5-1.0
D
im
en
si
on
 2
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
-0.2
-0.4
-0.6
-0.8
TemperatureChange
PriceBargaining
LobsterStrategy
Dependency
Storage
SocialCohesion
QuotaLeasing
QuotaCuts MarketConditions
LobsterQuality
Livelihood
DecisionMakingProcess
BuyUps
Page 1
Figure 1: Multidimensional Scaling of themes from semi-structured interviews, surveys,
and field notes. Similar to a biplot generated using Principle Components Analysis (PCA),
the x and y-axes delineate the coordinates of each theme or sub-theme in 2-dimensional
space. This analysis provides a visualization of the level of similarity of themes, based on
their co-occurrences in individual responses.
5.1. Procedural Justice and Social Cohesion265
The decision-making processes that harvesters discussed included meet-266
ings with lobster fishing area (LFA) management boards, consultations over267
policy with the DFO, and science advisory meetings. Harvesters and associ-268
ation leaders regarded the decision-making procedures as unfair. Of the six269
criteria for procedural justice identified by Daigle et al. (1996), harvesters and270
buyers suggested that decision-making procedures were inconsistent, based271
chance (Sturrock and Rocha, 2000). Thus, MDS plots with 13 objects that approach this
value can be considered to be statistically significant.
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on inaccurate information, inflexible or irreversible, and did not give fisher-272
men the opportunity to adequately voice their concerns.273
Meetings between DFO and industry generally allow industry to voice274
their opinions and concerns, but respondents complained that their concerns275
were not represented. For example, one local expert stated:276
These management boards are only in an advisory capac-277
ity. . . [DFO] will basically dictate what the policies are. . . There278
has to be a more direct involvement with these sets of policies . . .279
These decisions frustrated and dissatisfied industry and demotivated their280
participation in the process. Harvesters believed that participation does not281
only lead to frustration, it can also serve to legitimize the DFO decisions282
they oppose.283
. . . DFO said “Well you fellas passed this.” And he said, “No,284
we didn’t pass it. This is what you told us and we had to pick285
one or the other. It ain’t what we wanted at all.” (local expert)286
Harvesters and local experts also suggested that decisions were inconsis-287
tent among officials and over time.288
. . . we used to have to comply to owner-operator [policy] . . . then289
this lady came in Yarmouth and she said, “No, now you are al-290
lowed to stack a license” . . . then she was transferred, so who do291
you complain with? (harvester)292
Inconsistency creates uncertain conditions that make it difficult for fishermen293
and new entrants to plan, invest, and retire.294
Many in the industry believed that the scientific information used to295
determine quota allocations was inaccurate. Harvesters and quota groups296
have criticized the techniques the DFO used to estimate groundfish biomass,297
which determine quota allocations. The scientific method of random sam-298
pling should estimate overall abundance for a fishing zone, provided that the299
sampling protocol accounts for the spatial and temporal heterogeneity of the300
resource. To fishermen, this practice underestimates groundfish abundance.301
Some random samples are located in areas that fishermen know have low302
productivity. Further, as water temperatures and currents have changed,303
fishermen have noticed that productive fishing areas have changed. Har-304
vesters argued that sampling strategies should reflect these environmental305
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changes. DFO scientists have been unable to present scientific information306
in a manner that is salient and legitimate to industry (see Cash et al., 2003).307
Finally, industry complained that DFO decisions are difficult to alter308
when conditions change or if the decision proves to be counterproductive.309
According to a local expert, “If the fisherman makes a decision, . . . in a years310
time, he sees it’s no good, he will change it. DFO puts it in place . . . you311
might live a lifetime trying to get it changed . . . .”312
In addition to the procedural problems suggested by Daigle et al. (1996),313
harvesters pointed out that the decision-making process is complicated by314
communication problems. While fishermen have extensive knowledge of their315
fishery,316
. . . when it comes to conversation with, take lawyers or govern-317
ment people . . . you just can’t comprehend what they are trying318
to tell you, and they can make things sound good that aren’t319
good. (harvester)320
This perception that decision-making is unfair was a constraint to the col-321
lective agency of harvesters. Participation in decision-making does not seem322
to make rules more reflective of harvester perspectives, so there is little incen-323
tive to participate. This reinforces an individualist approach to responding324
to problems. As we discuss below, while it may be possible that greater so-325
cial cohesion among harvesters would improve the decision-making process,326
harvester groups face significant barriers to collective action.327
Harvesters frequently talked about the need to “stick together,” and to328
make decisions themselves rather than leave decision-making to the DFO.329
But some local experts suggested that harvesters needed to change their330
mindset to work together. One local expert stated,331
It’s [currently] about me and I, and they got to remember,332
they gotta change their mindset because . . . before we can get333
anything done . . . its going to have to be about we and us.334
Sticking together, however was presented as a particular challenge. While335
some were proud of the solidarity among harvesters during the strike in May336
2012, others stated that “people were fighting against each other instead of337
standing up for each other.” Fights occurred when some went fishing while338
others were on strike. Much debate centered on the capability of different339
harvesters to miss fishing days in the fall. According to a harvester, “ . . . when340
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you got a big debt hanging over your head, and it affects the way you think341
. . . ”342
Harvesters in SWNS often are attached to their place and identity. One343
harvester stated that fishing is “in my blood and I love it.” While simi-344
larities and shared identities and attachments can bind communities, differ-345
ences in scale of fishing operation, fishing technology, and geography split346
people apart. These differences, combined with a strong culture of individ-347
ualism (Apostle and Barrett, 1992) make it difficult for fishermen to stick348
together. Although they face a common problem, meetings frequently get349
“. . . into an uproar and a fight ‘cause everybody’s got a different opinion350
. . . ” (harvester). Some harvesters reported that decreasing social interac-351
tion and increasing competitive “cutthroat” attitudes have further divided352
communities. For example, many harvesters said that people used to help353
each other haul their boats up for repairs and cleaning. According to one354
harvester, “Today, they might try to knock your boat over to smash it in355
two.” Another harvester suggested that “. . . there’s no helping one another356
out. . . we’re losing our culture.”357
Nevertheless, though competitive, fishermen told many stories of the com-358
munity acting collectively. The most significant example occurred in Febru-359
ary, 2013, when five men from Woods Harbour were lost while fishing for360
halibut in rough winter seas. Frustrated when the coast guard called off361
their search, the Barrington community pooled their resources to continue362
the search, and helped to pay for a group of fishing vessels carrying chartered363
rescue divers. Though rescue divers could not find the lost men, the fishing364
vessels recovered the hull of the vessel 100 kilometres offshore. This brought365
closure to the family and friends of the lost harvesters. By August 2013, a366
charity raised $111,000 in local and national donations, which was given to367
the families of the lost men.368
This story demonstrates the capacity of people in Barrington to act col-369
lectively to respond to a disaster. But while the fishing industry faces many370
common challenges, they have been unable to respond collectively. Har-371
vesters have social bonds within communities, but often do not trust har-372
vesters from other communities, or government officials. Thus while har-373
vesters have strong networks of trust within a community, inter-community374
bonds are too weak to support organizations that represent larger regions.375
These constraints together limit the ability of harvester groups to re-shape376
the policies they deem most important to their livelihoods; policies that de-377
termine who owns and controls the fisheries.378
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5.2. Ownership and Control of Fisheries379
Collective action, procedural justice, and individual vulnerability is also380
tied to the sense of control actors have over their resources and decision381
options. Licenses and quotas, the primary institutions that govern access382
to fish, were core concerns. A harvester’s ownership of quotas and lobster383
licenses determine fishing costs, and the share of landed value they receive384
for selling their fish.385
Control was explained as an issue of individual agency: those who antici-386
pated the quota system found ways to secure a larger share. One processing387
company had an “inside scoop,” and made “smart purchases” to secure quota388
by buying licenses and vessels before the transition to quota management.389
“But the little fella, for a quick fix, was selling thinking it was the best way390
out” (local expert). The decision to sell quota and exit fisheries was exac-391
erbated by successive quota cuts, which also reduced a harvester’s sense of392
control over historically accessible resources. The “little fellas” were often393
hand-line fishermen who did not keep accurate records of their catches, and394
consequently received low allocations. As big fella bought up little fella,395
quota ownership became concentrated. Quota-owning processors benefited396
from both ends of the margin by leasing out quota, and by buying fish caught397
from the quota they lease out.398
The quota system was implemented to improve stock abundance, and in-399
centivize stewardship among harvesters. But price signals and single-species400
quotas have incentivized high-grading and discarding, locally referred to as401
“shacking” fish. Thus harvesters are individually incentivized to engage in402
short-term behavior that compromises the potential for improved quota ac-403
cess in the future.404
Discarding occurs when it is difficult to catch one quota species without405
catching others. For example, when the quota for codfish is reached, some406
fishermen continue to fish for haddock and discard cod. In an informal dis-407
cussion, a group of fishermen and fish buyers agreed that quota allocations408
with a ratio of haddock to cod of about 4:1 is feasible. As this ratio in-409
creases, it becomes difficult to catch haddock without overrunning the cod410
quota. The higher the ratio, the more likely a harvester will “shack off”411
cod. But shacking is not the only strategy to avoid overruns. Groundfishing412
vessels often shared information on cod catches in an attempt to find fishing413
grounds with less cod.414
High grading can occur in a single species fishery when different size-415
classes of a species have a higher wharf price, and when it is difficult to catch416
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one size exclusively. In January 2010, cod prices ranged from $0.75/LB for417
large to $0.35/LB for small codfish. Assuming a vessel has a quota for 10,000418
pounds of codfish, a vessel landing 100% large cod would make $4000 more419
than a vessel landing 100% small cod. A local expert suggested that the420
incentive to discard is even more pronounced when the incomes from lobster421
fishing are low.422
My theory would be high grading would be worse when you423
have a bad season in the lobster industry . . . When the lobster424
industry was booming . . . the guys would come in the office . . . and425
they would say, “sell my fish,” and I’d say, “So what do you want426
for it?” “Doesn’t matter, long as I get enough to pay you your427
dues and I get a little money tucked aside for deer hunting.”428
. . . Now it’s not the same. “What’s the most you think I can429
get?”430
Many fishermen fear that the lobster industry will eventually succumb431
to the same process of consolidation that has occurred in the quota fish-432
eries. New legal arrangements between buyers and harvesters–controlling433
agreements–have emerged, which allow harvesters to maintain access to the434
competitive fishery, but at a cost to independence. In a controlling agree-435
ment, a company or individual agrees to pay a retiring harvester to transfer436
their license. The retiring harvester will then transfer that license to an eligi-437
ble harvester in a contractual agreement with the company. The new entrant,438
then, is bound to the obligations set out in the contract with the company.439
This arrangement has become more prevalent as the market price of licenses440
increased to as much as $500,000, and banks became hesitant to lend money441
for license purchases (Bodiguel, 2002; Weston, 2009). Individuals or agen-442
cies have also used controlling agreements to circumnavigate rules that limit443
quota concentration. While the DFO sets limits on how much quota one444
individual can own, some individuals own well over this limit by controlling445
multiple licenses. In Barrington, 11% of survey respondents reported that446
they were currently in a controlling agreement, and 6% reported that they447
were previously in controlling agreements. Local experts living south of Bar-448
rington suggested that controlling agreements were much more prevalent in449
neighboring ports.450
The details of these controlling agreements vary. An owner-operator typ-451
ically splits the revenue from a fishing trip into a share for the boat, a share452
for the captain, and the remaining share is divided among crew. Harvesters453
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give a share of their landed value to the owner of the controlling agreement.454
One harvester tied to a lobster buyer paid 47% of his landed value to the455
buyer, fishing expenses were then subtracted, and the remainder was split456
equally among captain and crew. In this arrangement, the captain does not457
own the boat, gear, or license. Other informants estimated that 10-15% is458
deducted from total revenues when the captain owns the boat and gear, but459
not the license.460
With no large stake in the fishery, a harvester in a controlling agreement461
“can walk away anytime [they] like.” Another harvester reported that a462
controlling agreement saved him from losing his boat. Nevertheless, fishing463
communities are concerned about losing control and maintaining their local464
norms and practices.465
The bigger companies, the ones that own all these groundfish466
quotas will buy up the lobster licenses also because they got the467
overhead . . . They’ll never go aboard the vessel, but they want to468
just take over. . . (local expert)469
Another harvester suggested that companies have taken advantage of the470
current economic decline to further consolidate their control. “There are 25471
boats in arrears with the loan board that can’t pay their interest. . . [A private472
agency] is buying up boats in arrears.”473
Some lobster buyers argued that agencies that own licenses through con-474
trolling agreements distorted the costs of fishing upwards. When the shares475
to controlling agreements are high, it leaves tighter margins for captain and476
crew. A retired crewmember provided the example of a captain engaged in477
a trust agreement who had “paid for his license twice” in shares. But con-478
trolling agreements may also drive down the price for a harvester, because,479
in a controlling agreement “he’s got no choice, he’s got to sell to the buyer”480
(harvester).481
A local expert suggested that control of lobster licenses allows captains482
and processors to have greater control over labor.483
If they didn’t catch any fish, well they can’t pay, and the crews484
have to stay on, because, say that dragger owns 7 lobster licenses485
. . . unless you don’t want to lose your lobster site, you’re gonna486
stay on that boat.487
In the above sections, we have shown how harvesters perceive their in-488
teractions with government, and with the institutions that influence their489
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fishing practices. In the following section, we discuss how these perceptions490
play out at sea, as harvesters fish for lobsters, and respond to economic and491
ecological signals.492
5.3. Economic Change, Ecological Change, and Lobster Prices493
The institutional context of harvesters’ and buyers’ decisions extends far494
beyond the local dynamics of quotas, contracts and licenses. Respondents495
described a complex web of effort, storage, and exchange that links a fisher-496
man in Barrington to dinner tables internationally. This process exhibits a497
seasonal pattern that fishermen and buyers knowingly exploit. At the begin-498
ning of the season, catches are high and buyers often open at a lower price.499
At this time, harvesters store a large proportion of their catch in lobster cars,500
semi-submerged wood-and-wire cages. With cold fall and winter tempera-501
tures, lobsters can be stored alive with minimal effects on quality. Storms and502
rough seas in the winter months limit fishing effort, and cold temperatures503
limit lobster activity. Buyers store lobsters in tankhouses with refrigerated504
pools of circulated seawater. Demand generally increases through Decem-505
ber and continues to rise through February. Harvesters can often expect to506
get double the wharf price that they receive during the opening of the sea-507
son. Economic, social, and ecological changes increase the uncertainty of the508
benefits to engaging in the above practices.509
Previous statistical analyses have explained the variance in wharf price510
for lobsters using data on the US-Canada currency exchange rate, overall511
lobster landings, United States GDP, and the extent to which lobster landings512
are being sent to processing plants (Holland, 2011; Fisheries and Oceans513
Statistical Services, 2012). Poor economic conditions in the United States514
since the economic crisis of 2008 have resulted in a decline in demand for515
lobsters. Additionally, increased lobster landings have increased gluts at the516
beginning of the season, so more lobsters are sent to processing plants. A517
local buyer described the economic conditions that led to low prices in the518
spring of 2012:519
The Americans start dropping their price . . . The weather was520
starting to get better in March, we still had product, our boats521
still had their product the first week of March, and it was getting522
scary. . . So we sold them and give [the harvesters] the same as523
what we got for them, and ours was still in storage. . . That’s why524
we had to start selling them to the processors because the quality525
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was starting to go down. . . and the fishermen we’re starting to put526
their gear out for the spring.527
With increased landings in the beginning of the season and decreased de-528
mand, buyers could not sell their product to the live market quickly enough.529
Lobsters stored in tankhouses and lobster cars lost quality, and with the530
threat of lobsters dying, buyers reportedly sold their lobsters to processors531
at a loss.532
The volatility in the market is exacerbated by changing environmental533
conditions. Changing water temperatures affect the abundance and the qual-534
ity of lobsters. Higher water temperatures raise metabolic rates, and lobsters535
may molt more often and at different times. This leads to storage problems.536
Harvesters often recounted unanticipated events when storing lobsters, such537
as lobsters molting in storage, or more frequent die-offs.538
Water temperatures also influence the reproduction and migration pat-539
terns of lobsters. In the spring, lobsters migrate to shallower and warmer540
inshore waters for molting and mating, and then migrate back to deeper and541
more stable offshore waters in the fall as surface temperatures decrease (Chen542
et al., 2006). Harvesters have shifted their fishing effort to different grounds543
as previously productive grounds have become less so. The ecological in-544
teractions that have led to these changing spatiotemporal patterns have not545
been well studied, but studies have demonstrated the importance of water546
temperatures in lobster spatiotemporal distribution (e.g., Pinsky et al., 2013;547
Waddy and Aiken, 2005; Pezzack and Duggan, 1986; Chen et al., 2005).548
The abundance and quality of lobsters is also a product of harvesting549
strategies:550
It used to be an inshore fishery . . . That [inshore] guy’s catch,551
let’s say he catches 30,000 pounds at $5 a pound is $150,000.552
The guy that’s put the effort in it that goes deeper . . . everybody553
knows the deeper you go the less the quality is, if he catches554
70,000 pounds at the same price... who’s making the bucks? So555
we’re forcing the industry to go [fish harder] . . . that’s why people556
are making bigger boats . . . (harvester)557
In the lobster industry, quality-based pricing would not increase lobster mor-558
tality because the majority of lobsters caught in traps can be returned to559
sea and live, while most groundfish species cannot. Without quality-based560
pricing, harvesters are motivated to fish for quantity, especially when prices561
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are low. One harvester stated that “. . . we’re forcing a lot harder in the win-562
tertime, fishing harder to try to make up for the downfall in price.” Some563
harvesters used cost-reducing strategies, such as “slack[ing] back on the gas564
pedal” to improve fuel efficiency and increasing the time between hauling565
traps, or soaking time. Soaking traps for longer increases the catch per trap,566
and decreases the fuel costs associated with hauling traps, but results in567
smaller catches than do aggressive fishing strategies.568
Warmer water temperatures have incentivized catching for volume. Ac-569
cording to one harvester,“I would say a lot of them managed because of the570
good weather, they fished all through the winters so their catch was up.” In571
the 1980s, harvesters landed their traps in late January until the weather im-572
proved and lobsters started to “crawl” Davis (1984) But harvesters reported573
that lobsters were more active throughout the winter, due to warmer waters574
and more stable water temperatures offshore.575
In sum, market conditions, storage, lobster quality, and lobstering strate-576
gies lowered demand, increased storage risks, made lobster catch quality less577
predictable and resulted in lower wharf prices. In the May 2012 strike, more578
than half of the 1688 harvesters in LFAs 33 and 34 refused to fish if prices579
dropped below $5 CDN per pound. Harvesters were divided on the effec-580
tiveness of this tactic. A harvester stated that “[i]t’s not like . . . we won’t581
catch our lobsters this week because the price is down, when the lobsters are582
crawling and the water’s warm, you gotta catch ‘em.” But another harvester583
argued that “[y]ou’re not going to miss out because you’ll catch them in the584
spring.”585
Steinberg (1984) recommended collective bargaining to correct imbal-586
ances in the port market system, in which harvesters have little choice but587
to sell to local buyers, and local buyers have, in turn, little choice but to sell588
to wholesalers with greater market control. But local buyers often suggested589
that the strike tactic has been disproportionately directed at them. One590
buyer said that “these fishermen think that the dealers get together and say591
‘let’s rip off the fishermen’. It’s not that way. I was losing money.. . . . The592
big cookers [processors] set the price. I’ve been taking a lot of abuse.” In an593
interview involving two buyers, both noted the upward pressure on prices in594
some regions. For example, “Cape [Sable] Island is a hornets nest. Buyers595
are fighting over boats, and this spills over off the island.” The majority of596
this competition, however, was reported to be at the local or port-market597
level.598
The lobster strike was a demonstration of agency in collective action599
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among harvesters in response to economic and ecological change. But given600
current incentives, perceptions of decision-making that involve government,601
and the changing ownership and control of fisheries, harvesters have favored602
individual responses to these problems. In the next section we show that603
these strategies result in vulnerable outcomes for some, but not others.604
5.4. Livelihood Outcomes605
Harvesters believed that livelihood outcomes varied according to a har-606
vester’s access to quota (see Figure 1). Many harvesters who continue to fish607
groundfish lease quotas from dealers, processors, or retired harvesters. While608
quota prices are driven by local demand, wharf prices are influenced by inter-609
national economic conditions. As lobster-fishing revenues decline, more har-610
vesters attempt to supplement their incomes in quota fisheries. This drives611
up local demand, and increases quota prices, irrespective of wharf prices.612
One harvester estimated lease prices that amounted to as much as 80% of613
wharf prices in the halibut fishery, a number that closely approximates those614
reported in Pinkerton and Edwards (2009). But quota lessees will also be615
willing to pay more for quota when incomes from lobster are low. According616
to a harvester, “You want to know why they go? ‘Cause they’re grasping617
at straws, trying to hang on, a little is better than nothing right?” When618
margins between lease price and wharf price are small, the risk of returning619
to port with a negative balance is higher.620
Tight margins in the quota fisheries have increased harvester’s depen-621
dence on the lobster fishery. Davis (1984) reported that harvesters fished622
a portfolio of species. In a multi-species context, harvesters would “spread623
things out all over the year, [now] they got to depend on that one season to624
make their living and there’s so much pressure being put on it” (harvester).625
This dependency creates a lot of tension as lobstering season begins because,626
“there is a lot riding on the first haul of the year.” In some households,627
spouses have taken jobs to supplement household incomes. Harvesters often628
spend the summers repairing and building traps and lobster cars to reduce629
the costs of fishing.630
A local expert summarized the potential livelihood outcomes in the lob-631
ster fishery:632
Every family has a different challenge . . . it’s hard because633
the people that have been in the fishery for years . . . basically634
owns everything they have. People that are . . . getting into the635
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fishery are borrowing large amounts of money . . . and if the prices636
of lobsters are down and your catches are basically holding the637
same . . . cost of everything is higher, you got less money, and you638
are not going to make it.639
Some respondents suggest that diminished incomes are more pronounced640
for crewmembers. For example, one captain describes the effects of quota641
and license leasing on crew shares: “They’ve got such a high price-tag on642
fish [quota], for us to pay them . . . plus expenses, there is no money left for643
the crews.” Another captain suggested that “a lot of captains are taking644
less to try to keep the crews . . . cause if not . . . they’re not going to stay645
there.” Captains must navigate the tradeoff between maintaining their boat646
and keeping their crew. When the crewmembers’ share of earnings from a647
fishing trip are too high, a captain will not have enough money to keep up648
with boat maintenance, but when boat shares are too high, it is more likely649
that skilled crew will seek out another boat to work on, or emigrate.650
6. Conclusions651
Vulnerability in this case is clearly a product of individuals constructing652
livelihood strategies in a context of significant institutional and environmen-653
tal change. The interviewees reveal how their choices are not only constrained654
by the institutions that govern their resource base, but also by the sense of655
trust and agency that exists among actors in the system. Thus, fishing house-656
hold choices are not only a feature of institutional arrangements, but of how657
those arrangements differently affect actors within a system, and how those658
actors perceive fairness in rule implementation. While the SES approach659
allows for a systematic analysis of the role and function of system elements,660
we examined these elements from a political ecology understanding, demon-661
strating the importance of an actor-oriented perspective on the meaning of662
institutions for their livelihoods.663
The decision-making process involving the state and fishing households664
lacked procedural justice, and harvesters often refused to participate in pro-665
cesses they perceived to be illegitimate. Harvesters recognized the impor-666
tance of working together to articulate an alternative vision for governing667
their fisheries, but lacked the inter-community social ties and trust to do so.668
Meanwhile, buyers or large fishing companies with sufficient economic and669
political capital have maintained their businesses by buying quota, and by670
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circumnavigating rules that attempt to limit consolidation. Fishing house-671
holds were concerned that fishing communities are losing control of their local672
industry, and the benefits, cultural norms, and practices that come with local673
control. Those with less political and economic power were more sensitive674
and have a lower capacity to respond to challenges. These include harvesters675
who fished lobster exclusively, those with high fishing costs due to debt and676
quota leasing costs, and crewmembers. With low capacity to respond col-677
lectively, harvesters have favored individual strategies such as attempting to678
catch more, decreasing costs, or investing in storage facilities. These findings679
indicate that vulnerability is being produced not only through the imple-680
mentation of institutions that structure choice, but also the procedures of681
decision-making and individual agency that construct the institutional con-682
text.683
These results underscore the need for integrating Ostrom’s institutional684
approach and political-ecological approaches that consider the interactions685
between structure and agency. Ostrom’s (2007) framework provides a use-686
ful starting point for examining the institutions, interactions and outcomes687
in natural resource use. Brewer (2012), however, has demonstrated that688
political-ecological approaches can broaden the narrative regarding the suc-689
cesses and failures of common pool governance regimes. Broadening this nar-690
rative will likely lead to constructive policy and institutional change (Leach691
et al., 2010).692
To improve policy, collective action, and livelihood outcomes in SWNS,693
we suggest initiatives that encourage co-production of knowledge, informa-694
tion sharing, and inclusive action arenas involving harvesters and the state.695
Organizations such as the Fishermen and Scientist Research Society (FSRS)696
have built trust between scientists and harvesters. But decision-making are-697
nas must facilitate discussions between many communities to determine the698
sources of consensus and difference, and to better fit the scale of policy to699
geographic scales of the dilemmas harvesters face. Harvester groups can-700
not change global economic conditions, but the FSRS has collaborated with701
US scientists to develop the American Lobster Settlement Index to monitor702
variation in lobster settlement related to climate variability (Wahle et al.,703
2010). Additionally, LFA management board leadership and the Maine Lob-704
stermen’s Association have established collaborative ties, with an Annual705
US/Canadian Lobster Town Meeting, and binational marketing task forces706
and collaborations since 2012. Finally, we found vulnerability was linked to707
harvester relationships to markets for fish and fishing access rights. Improv-708
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ing trust and equalizing bargaining power in buyer-harvester interactions709
would likely ensure that harvesters and buyers equitably benefit from fishing710
resources. Current property rights regimes could be reformed to ensure the711
viability of captains entering the fishery, and improve access to affordable712
fishing quotas and leases.713
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